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                                                                   PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3755 
___________ 
 
PATRICK COLEMAN, 
                                     Appellant 
v. 
 
SUPERINTENDENT GREENE SCI; THE DISTRICT 
ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA; THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA                                              
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-14-cv-01683) 
District Judge: Honorable Stewart Dalzell 
___________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 19, 2016 
 
Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge,* HARDIMAN, and 
RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
                                                 
* Chief Judge Theodore A. McKee’s term as Chief 
Judge ended on September 30, 2016. 
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(Filed: January 5, 2017) 
 
Michael Wiseman, Esq.  
P.O. Box 120 
Swarthmore, PA 19081  
 Counsel for Appellant  
 
Max C. Kaufman, Esq. 
Philadelphia County Office of District Attorney  
3 South Penn Square 
Philadelphia, PA 19107  
 Counsel for Appellees 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal involves a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus that was dismissed as untimely under the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. 
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Despite his tardy filing, 
Appellant Patrick Coleman claims that it was a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice to deny him his day in court. Because 
Coleman cannot satisfy the actual innocence requirement of 
the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to AEDPA, 
we will affirm.  
I 
Coleman was tried along with several other defendants 
for his involvement in a gang-related shooting that occurred 
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at Tobin’s Inn Restaurant on August 10, 1989. See Coleman 
v. Folino, 2015 WL 6379296, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 2015). 
The month-long trial included 76 witnesses for the 
Commonwealth, only one of whom testified as to Coleman’s 
involvement in the shooting. Id. Coleman was convicted of 
first-degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, 
criminal conspiracy, and possession of an instrument of a 
crime. Id. at *1–2. Significantly for purposes of this appeal, 
Coleman was acquitted of violating the Pennsylvania Corrupt 
Organizations Act (PCOA), 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 991. Id. at 
*2. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed Coleman’s 
convictions, and he did not seek review by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court. Id.    
Two years after Coleman’s convictions became final, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the PCOA did not 
apply to an individual’s participation in a wholly illegitimate 
enterprise. Commonwealth v. Besch, 674 A.2d 655, 655 (Pa. 
1996).1 Had Besch been the law when Coleman was tried, he 
could not have been charged with a PCOA violation because 
the gang to which he belonged was wholly illegitimate. 
Coleman, 2015 WL 6379296, at *3. Coleman failed to raise a 
                                                 
1 Two months after Besch, apparently in response to 
that decision, “the [Pennsylvania] General Assembly 
amended the [PCOA’s] definition of the term ‘enterprise’ 
explicitly making clear that the statute targets both legitimate 
and wholly illegitimate enterprises.” Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 936 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 2007); see also 18 Pa. C.S. 
§ 911(h)(3). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court later ruled that 
Besch was not a “new rule of law” and was retroactive to 
cases on collateral review. Kendrick v. Dist. Att’y of Phila. 
Cty., 916 A.2d 529, 531 (Pa. 2007).   
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claim under Besch when he twice sought post-conviction 
relief under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act 
(PCRA), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541. 
Coleman’s PCRA petitions—a pro se petition filed in 
2002 and a counseled petition filed in 2007—sought 
reinstatement of his appellate rights based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Coleman claimed his attorney had 
agreed to appeal his conviction to the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court but failed to do so. Both petitions were denied. 
In 2014, Coleman filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania. Coleman argued that he was denied 
due process because the evidence introduced against his co-
defendants was unfairly imputed to him. The Magistrate 
Judge recommended that Coleman’s petition be dismissed as 
untimely under AEDPA, which imposes a one-year statute of 
limitation on applications for writs of habeas corpus. 
Although Coleman conceded his petition was filed well 
outside that period, he asserted that his claim should be 
considered under the fundamental miscarriage of justice 
exception and principles of equitable tolling. 
The District Court dismissed the petition with 
prejudice. The Court found that Coleman did not meet the 
requirements of the fundamental miscarriage of justice 
exception because he could not prove he was actually 
innocent. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that “reasonable 
jurists could disagree as to whether a conviction arising from 
a twenty-eight day trial where seventy-six witnesses were 
called and only one testified as to Coleman’s participation in 
the Tobin’s Inn Shooting can be considered a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 2015 WL 6379296, at *6. 
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Accordingly, the Court issued a certificate of appealability 
“on the sole issue of whether the [fundamental miscarriage of 
justice exception] applies to this matter and therefore excuses 
Coleman’s untimely filing of his petition.” Id.  
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  
§§ 2241 and 2254. We have appellate jurisdiction to review 
the certified issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. “Our review of the 
timeliness of a federal habeas application is plenary.” 
Hartmann v. Carroll, 492 F.3d 478, 480 (3d Cir. 2007). 
III 
AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitation “to an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State Court.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(d)(1). Because Coleman’s final judgment was entered 
before Congress adopted AEDPA, Coleman had until April 
23, 1997 to apply for federal habeas relief. See Long v. 
Wilson, 393 F.3d 390, 394 n.4 (3d Cir. 2004). Coleman 
concedes, as he must, that his petition was untimely. 
Coleman argues that his petition was subject to the 
fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to AEDPA. This 
exception “is grounded in the ‘equitable discretion’ of habeas 
courts to see that federal constitutional errors do not result in 
the incarceration of innocent persons.” Herrera v. Collins, 
506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993). The exception may overcome 
procedural default rules such as the timing requirements of 28 
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 
1924, 1931–32 (2013) (citing cases). And it “seeks to balance 
the societal interests in finality, comity, and conservation of 
 6 
 
scarce judicial resources with the individual interest in justice 
that arises in the extraordinary case.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 
U.S. 298, 324 (1995).  
The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is 
narrow. The Supreme Court has applied it “to a severely 
confined category: cases in which new evidence shows ‘it is 
more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 
convicted [the petitioner].’” McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1933 
(alteration in original) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329). Put 
differently, the exception is only available when a petition 
presents “evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot 
have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is 
also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless 
constitutional error.” Id. at 1936 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 
316). In Schlup, the Supreme Court emphasized that 
“[w]ithout any new evidence of innocence, even the existence 
of a concededly meritorious constitutional violation is not in 
itself sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice that would 
allow a habeas court to reach the merits of a barred claim.” 
513 U.S. at 316.  
Coleman “cannot and does not argue that his habeas 
petition presented a claim of factual actual innocence.” 
Coleman Br. 27. Instead, he argues that the actual innocence 
requirement noted by the Supreme Court in Schlup and 
McQuiggin is merely dicta. As such, he suggests we can (and 
should) excuse his late filing, claiming he suffered a 
fundamental miscarriage of justice because the (later) invalid 
PCOA charge rendered his trial unfair, even though he was 
acquitted of that charge. 
We disagree with Coleman’s characterization of the 
actual innocence requirement. A dictum is “a statement in a 
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judicial opinion that could have been deleted without 
seriously impairing the analytical foundations of the holding.” 
United States v. Mallory, 765 F.3d 373, 381 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(citation omitted). As we shall explain, the actual innocence 
requirement formed the basis of the Supreme Court’s holding 
in McQuiggin. 
The Supreme Court “granted certiorari to resolve a 
Circuit conflict on whether AEDPA’s statute of limitations 
can be overcome by a showing of actual innocence.” 
McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1930. The Court answered in the 
affirmative, “hold[ing] that actual innocence, if proved, 
serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass 
whether the impediment is a procedural bar . . . or[] . . . 
expiration of the statute of limitations.” Id. at 1928. As noted 
above, the Court emphasized repeatedly throughout its 
opinion that this exception is rare: “[A] petitioner does not 
meet the threshold requirement unless he persuades the 
district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, 
acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (alteration in original) 
(quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329); see also id. at 1933 (“The 
miscarriage of justice exception, we underscore, applies to a 
severely confined category: cases in which new evidence 
shows ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror 
would have convicted [the petitioner].’” (quoting Schlup, 513 
U.S. at 329)); id. at 1935 (“To invoke the miscarriage of 
justice exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations, we 
repeat, a petitioner ‘must show that it is more likely than not 
that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light 
of the new evidence.’” (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327)); id. 
at 1936 (“The gateway should open only when a petition 
presents ‘evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot 
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have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is 
also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless 
constitutional error.’” (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316)). 
These statements—when combined with the absence of any 
language in the Court’s opinion to the contrary—convince us 
that the actual innocence requirement was essential to the 
Court’s holding.2   
Because Coleman failed to present a claim of actual 
innocence, we hold that his habeas petition was untimely 
under AEDPA. In doing so, we adhere to the Supreme 
Court’s guidance in McQuiggin: the fundamental miscarriage 
of justice exception applies only in cases of actual innocence. 
133 S. Ct. at 1928. To avoid the statutory time bar, a 
petitioner must “persuade[] the district court that, in light of 
the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have 
voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.  
                                                 
2 Even if the Court’s actual innocence requirement 
were dicta, “we [will] not idly ignore considered statements 
the Supreme Court makes in dicta.” In re McDonald, 205 
F.3d 606, 612 (3d Cir. 2000). “To ignore what we perceive as 
persuasive statements by the Supreme Court is to place our 
rulings, and the analysis that underlays them, in peril.” Galli 
v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265, 274 (3d Cir. 
2007). So even if we found the Court’s analysis of the actual 
innocence requirement to be dicta, we would reach the same 
result. 
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IV 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order dismissing Coleman’s petition for writ of 
habeas corpus. 
